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[SUMMER

M4SHINGTON LAW REVIEW

followed by a suffix, indicating his representative capacity.... ." If this
rule were to be followed it would necessitate finding that the note in
question was endorsed by the payee.
Do the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act require
that a contrary result be reached? There are no express provisions in
the N.I.L. that require that the endorsement take any special form or
that the payee's name be included in the endorsement of an instrument
negotiated by an agent. The older cases which hold that it is not
necessary that the payee's name be included in the endorsement have
not been overruled, but the case law that has been reported since the
general adoption of the N.I.L. has allowed only slight variations between the name of the payee and the name appearing as an endorsement.'
The Glaser case illustrates the court's thinking upon this matter and
places Washington among those jurisdictions requiring a substantial
similarity between the name of the payee as it appears in the instrument
and the signature appearing on the reverse side of the instrument before
it will be held that the instrument is endorsed so as to enable the
transferee to claim as a holder in due course.
REX M. WALKER

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Default Judgment-Failure of Complaint to State Facts Sufficient
to Constitute Cause of Action-Waiver of Right to Attack Complaint. In Moody v. Moody,' the wife obtained a divorce by default
judgment on a complaint which alleged, "That for some time last past,
through incompatability [sic] of temperment [sic], plaintiff has been
the victim of mental cruelty inflicted on her by the defendant, which
has made her home-life [sic] and wellbeing [sic] burdensome, to the
point it has become impossible for her to live and cohabit with the
defendant; that all of said acts were without just cause or provocation
on the part of the plaintiff." That this complaint was ambiguous in the
least is apparent, for the question immediately presents itself, "What
4 First Nat. Bank of Shenandoah v. Kelgard, 91 Neb. 178, 135 N.W. 548 (1912) (note
payable to "Wonder Stock Powder Company" and endorsed, "James J. Doty, Prop."
was held to be defectively endorsed) ; Nokomis Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 205 II1. App.
54 (1917) (note payable to "Centeral Rate and Routing Agency" and endorsed
"Centeral Route and Rating Agency" was held to be defectively endorsed) ; Young v.
Henbree, 181 Okla. 202, 73 P.2d 393 (1937) (check payable to "Horn & Faulkner Oil
Trust" and endorsed "Horn & Faulkner, by L. H. Horn" was held to be defectively
endorsed).

1147 Wash. Dec. 355, 288 P.2d 229 (1955).
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were the acts which were without just cause or provocation?" However,
its greatest fault was not its ambiguity, but as the majority of the court
point out, its failure to come within any of the ten stated grounds for
divorce set forth in RCW 26.08.020. RCW 26.08.020 (5) provides
as a ground for divorce, "Cruel treatment of either party by the other,
or personal indignities rendering life burdensome." In comparing this
complaint with the RCW section, the majority opinion states that
neither incompatibility, uncongeniality, dissatisfaction, nor unhappiness constitute grounds for divorce, nor does mental cruelty in and of
itself constitute such grounds.'
In alleging mental cruelty through incompatibility of temperament,
plaintiff had in effect alleged that she and her husband were of different
temperament, and that as a result, she became a victim of mental
cruelty. The majority opinion holds that this complaint would have
been demurrable and it would have been the duty of the trial court to
sustain a demurrer to such complaint.
RCW 4.32.190 provides that, "If no objection be taken either by
demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the
same, excepting always the objection that the court has no jurisdiction,
or that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action,which objection can be made at any stage of the proceedings,
either in the superior or supreme court." (Emphasis added) Since the
court has decided that the complaint was demurrable in that it did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it would seem logical
and incumbent upon the court to next hold that the default judgment
awarding the plaintiff a divorce was void, as granting relief in excess
3
of what the plaintiff's complaint had shown her to be entitled.
But at this point the court holds that "by sitting idly by" and allowing a default judgment to be entered against him, the defendant has
waived his right to attack the complaint. Is not this exactly the situation which RCW 4.32.190 was meant to govern?'
The court did not need to rely on waiver to reach this result. As
both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Judge Finley
point out, the court has consistently relaxed the provisions of RCW
4.32.190 relating to complaints which fail to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, both by rules allowing amendments,' and
2 On the authority of Neff v. Neff, 30 Vn.2d 593, 192 P.2d 344 (1948).
3 23 Cyc. 740; State ex reL. First Nat. Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 306, 207
Pac. 23 (1922).
45 See also, Rule on Appeal 43, 34A Wn.2d 47, as amended effective January 2, 1953.
Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 6, 34A Wn.2d 71.
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by court interpretation of the complaint.' Where the defendant has not
raised the objection to the complaint, the court has, on appeal, brought
to the support of the complaint, every possible intendment and legitimate inference that might be drawn from its allegations, and only
where the defect in the complaint is one of substance which cannot be
cured by amendment or evidence has the court ordered a dismissal.7
Thus, in full consistency with former holdings, the court could have
interpreted the defects in the plaintiff's complaint as being curable by
amendment, and treated it as so amended. In concluding, the majority
opinion takes this stand, and holds that this is a second reason for
reaching this result of affirmance.
We are left now to determine which of the two reasons given is the
basis for the majority decision. If it be the latter, then we may quarrel
only with their liberal interpretation of the complaint, to which attack
the concurring opinion of Judge Finley is also open. If it be the former,
then we must conclude that the court has chosen to look upon the
provisions of RCW 4.32.190 with disfavor, and that in future decisions,
a failure to attack a cause of action, either by answer or by demurrer,
will result in a waiver of such objection.'
If the court desired this latter conclusion, it would have been more
clear had the court utilized the provisions of RCW 2.04.200, which
provides that all laws in conflict with rules of court are of no further
effect.? Thus, by amending Rule on Appeal 43, 34A Wn.2d 47, both
the undesirable part of that rule and of RCW 4.32.190 would be
abrogated. This method would appear more cogent than the circuitous
route followed by the majority in holding first that the complaint did
not state a cause of action, but that the defendant had waived his right
to object, and then concluding that the complaint, by liberal interpretation does state a cause of action.
Judge Finley, in his concurring opinion, finds fault with the majority's circuitous methods, and treats the complaint from the beginning
as stating a cause of action, if read liberally and not with an eye to
6 Hamilton v. Johnson, 137 Wash. 92, 241 Pac. 672 (1925); Bonne v. Security
Savings Society, 35 Wash. 696, 78 Pac. 38 (1904) ; O'Day v. Anbaum, 47 Wash. 684, 92
Pac. 421 (1907) ; Kelly v. Lum, 75 Wash. 135, 134 Pac. 819 (1913) ; Yeisley v. Smith,
82 Wash. 693, 144 Pac. 918 (1914). It is interesting to note that none of these cases
involved a default judgment, and it would appear that a distinction would be warranted
between cases of judgment by default and a case decided on its merits, for in cases by
default, it may be assumed that the defendant has had no benefit of counsel to advise him
on making objections.
7 See note 6, supra.
8 See note 4, .supra.
9 Note, 30 WASH. L. REV. 166 (1955).
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technicalities. He admits in his opinion that his interpretation is subject
to argument, and with this statement this writer must agree, for he finds
in the effect complained of, viz., mental cruelty, grounds for divorce,
although the statutory language of RCW 26.08.020 (5) calls for "cruel
treatment of either party by the other

.

.

."

and the complaint in this

case does not allege that the complained of mental cruelty was inflicted
by the conduct of the defendant, but as a result of "incompatibility of
temperment [sic] ."

If, as the majority holds, only mental cruelty caused by the conduct
of the defendant provides grounds for divorce, then the majority's
second reason for affirmance and the basis of Judge Finley's concurring
opinion marks a departure from the former holdings of the court in
Fix v. Fix1" and Donaldson v. Donaldson" where the court has said
that they are limited, in granting divorces, to the enumerated grounds
of the statutes.
It is clear from the decision of this case, that the court looks with
disfavor upon RCW 4.32.190 and the applicable section of Rule on
Appeal 43, 34 A Wn.2d 47, and in cases of default judgment will search
beyond the plain wording of the complaint in ruling upon objections to
the failure of the complaint to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action. '
RoGER L. WILL Ams

PROBATE
Probate-Removal of Guardian-Vacation of an Order Authorizing Settlement

of Claims. In re Whitish, 147 Wash. Dec. 585, 289 P.2d 340 (1955), was an action
by minors to remove their putative guardian and to set aside an order authorizing her
to execute releases and to settle claims. The guardian ad litem contended that the
putative guardian was not qualified to receive letters of guardianship. The putative
guardian's petition had recited that the minors were the owners of a claim totaling
$5,500 but that, after settlement of creditors' claims, the minors' estate would not
10 33 Wn.2d 229, 204 P.2d 1066 (1949).

1138 Wn2d 748, 231 P.2d 607 (1951).
12 The decision in this case was of unusual importance to the defendant in that its
outcome held a direct bearing on a criminal prosecution for murder. The superior court
of Asotin County entered the default judgment of divorce against the defendant on May
18, 1954. On June 8, 1954, the defendant was charged with the crime of first degree
murder in the same county. Eight days later, on June 16, 1954, the defendant gave notice
of appeal from the judgment of divorce. As was pointed out by the court in its second
paragraph of its opinion, neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney of Asotin
county, who appeared in the divorce appeal as amicus curiae, were as interested in the
"maintenance or the sanctity of the marriage relationship" as they were in the ability
of the plaintiff in the divorce action to appear as a witness against the defendant in
the murder trial.
Because of this highly important collateral issue, it would seem to furnish an
additional reason for the court to abide by the legislative dictates as manifested in both
RCW 26.08.020 and RCW 4.32.190.

